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The power of randomness
in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
Shuchi Chawla∗ David Malec† Balasubramanian Sivan‡
Abstract
We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mecha-
nism design problem—a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds
of resources to “unit-demand” agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. When the
agents’ preferences are single-dimensional Myerson’s seminal work [14] shows that randomness offers
no benefit—the optimal mechanism is always deterministic. In the multi-dimensional case, where each
agent’s preferences are given by different values for each of the available services, Briest et al. [7] re-
cently showed that the gap between the expected revenue obtained by an optimal randomized mechanism
and an optimal deterministic mechanism can be unbounded even when a single agent is offered only 4
services. However, this large gap is attained through unnatural instances where values of the agent for
different services are correlated in a specific way. We show that when the agent’s values involve no
correlation or a specific kind of positive correlation, the benefit of randomness is only a small constant
factor (4 and 8 respectively). Our model of positively correlated values (that we call additive values) is a
natural model for unit-demand agents and items that are substitutes. Our results extend to multiple agent
settings as well.
1 Introduction
A fundamental objective in the design of mechanisms is to maximize the seller’s revenue. In the absence
of any information about buyers’ preferences, i.e. in prior-free settings, randomization is a frequently used
algorithmic technique (see, e.g., [11] and references therein); In a spirit similar to randomness in online al-
gorithm design, it allows the seller to hedge against adversarial values. While randomization unsurprisingly
turns out to be essential for any guarantees on revenue in certain prior-free settings, it appears to be not so
in Bayesian settings where the designer has distributional information about the agents’ types and the goal
is to maximize revenue in expectation over the distribution. For example, for a single item auction in the
Bayesian setting, Myerson’s seminal work [14] shows that the optimal mechanism is always a deterministic
one.
In this work we investigate the power of randomness in the context of the following archetypical multi-
parameter optimal mechanism design problem — a single seller offers multiple kinds of service, and a
number of “unit-demand” agents are each interested in buying any one of the services. Whereas in Myerson’s
work each agent has a single-dimensional type (namely a value for the item under sale), in our setting each
agent has a multi-dimensional type characterized by a (different) value for each of the services offered by
the seller. An example of such a setting is an online travel agency selling airline tickets, hotel rooms, etc.
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Figure 1: An example from [18] contrasting the optimal item pricing and the optimal lottery pricing. The
regions R1, R2, and RLot denote the sets of valuations at which the agent buys item 1, item 2, and the
(1/2, 1/2) lottery respectively.
Customers have different preferences over different available services, but are only interested in buying one.
We study the Bayesian version of this problem: the distribution from which the buyers’ preferences are
drawn is known to the seller. Given Myerson’s observation about single-dimensional settings, one might
expect that in the multi-dimensional case the optimal mechanism (ignoring computational issues) is once
again deterministic. Thanassoulis [18] and Manelli and Vincent [12] independently discovered that this is
not the case. This raises the following natural question: what quantitative benefit do randomized mechanisms
offer over deterministic ones in Bayesian optimal mechanism design?
To answer this question we must first understand the structure of randomized mechanisms in multi-
dimensional settings. In the context of a single unit-demand agent and a seller offering multiple items,
any deterministic mechanism is simply a pricing for each of the items with the agent picking the one that
maximizes her utility (her value for the item minus its price). Likewise, randomized mechanisms can be
thought of as pricings for distributions or convex combinations over items. These convex combinations are
called lotteries. A risk-neutral buyer with a quasiconcave utility function buys the lottery that maximizes
his expected value minus the price of the lottery.
The following example due to Thanassoulis explains how lotteries work. Suppose that a seller offers two
items for sale to a single buyer, and that the buyer’s value for each of the items is independently uniformly
distributed in the interval [5, 6]. The optimal deterministic mechanism for the seller is to simply price each
of the items at p∗ = $5.097 (see Figure 1). In a randomized mechanism, the seller may in addition price a
(1/2, 1/2) distribution over the two items at a slightly lower price of p′ = $5.057. If the buyer buys this
lottery, the seller tosses a coin and allocates the first item to her with probability 1/2 and the second with
probability 1/2. A buyer that is nearly indifferent between the two items would prefer to buy the lottery
because of its lower cost, than either one of the items. While the seller loses some revenue by selling the
lower priced lottery with some probability, he gains by selling to a larger segment of the market (those that
cannot afford either of the individual items but can afford the lower priced lottery). In this example the gain
is more than the loss, so that introducing the lottery improves the seller’s revenue. As this example indicates,
lotteries help in optimal mechanism design by giving the seller more latitude to price discriminate among
buyers with different preferences.
In general, a randomized mechanism can offer to the buyer a menu of prices for arbitrarily many lotteries.
We call such a menu a lottery pricing, and likewise a deterministic pricing an item pricing. While in multiple
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Figure 2: An example of a product distribution for valuations contrasted against an example of an additive
distribution.
agent settings randomized mechanisms can be more complicated, we show that any such mechanism can
be interpreted as offering to each agent simultaneously a lottery pricing that is a function of values of other
agents.
The question of whether and to what extent randomization helps in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
is not merely a pedantic one. Mechanisms similar to lottery pricings are seen in practice. For example,
the website priceline.com routinely sells airline tickets to customers without disclosing at the time of sale
crucial details such as the time of travel, carrier, etc. While customers are unaware of the distribution from
which the final service is picked, the tradeoffs for customers are similar—the uncertainty in the quality of
the final item against the cheaper price. Travel agencies offering vacation packages use similar devices.
Until recently, the largest gap known between item pricings and lottery pricings for a single agent was
a gap of 3/2 due to Pavlov [15]; For the special case where values for different items are independent,
Thanassoulis gave the best gap example with a gap of 1.1. Recently Briest et al. [7] showed that in single-
agent settings in fact the gap between lottery pricings and item pricings can be unbounded even with only 4
items. However the value distributions for which such gaps are achieved are quite unnatural with the values
of different items being highly correlated. In this paper we show that the gap between lottery pricings and
item pricings is small for distributions involving limited correlation between items.
We further extend these results to the multiple-agent setting with the seller facing a general feasibility
constraint, obtaining the first results of this kind. Mechanism design in the multiple-agent multi-parameter
setting is poorly understood [19]. Until recently there were no general characterizations for optimal or
approximately optimal mechanisms similar to Myerson’s for the single-parameter case. Chawla et al. [9]
recently developed constant-factor approximations to optimal deterministic mechanisms in this setting for
a certain class of feasibility constraints (namely matroids and related set systems). We extend their results
to show that their (deterministic) mechanisms achieve a constant factor approximation with respect to the
optimal randomized mechanism as well, again implying a small gap between randomized and deterministic
mechanisms.
Our results and techniques
We follow a technique introduced in [8] for relating multi-parameter mechanisms to mechanisms for a
related single-parameter problem. Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg [8] relate a single unit-demand agent m-
item mechanism design problem to an m-agent single-item auction setting, by “splitting” the unit-demand
agent into m independent “copies”. They argue that the increased competition among copies benefits the
seller and leads to higher revenue. Formally, given an item pricing p they construct a truthful mechanism
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Ap that allocates the item to agent i whenever p allocates item i to the multi-parameter agent (that is, Ap
has the “same” allocation rule as p). They then argue that the price that Ap charges is no less than the
price that p charges for any instantiation of values. Therefore, the expected revenue of the optimal multi-
parameter mechanism is bounded above by the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for the related
single-parameter problem with copies. Chawla et al. use this upper bound to design an item pricing for the
multi-parameter problem with revenue within a factor of 3 of the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism
for the instance with copies, thereby obtaining a 3-approximation to the optimal deterministic mechanism
for the single-agent problem.
Unfortunately the upper bound of the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism does not hold for
randomized mechanisms. The appendix gives an example where the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for
the instance with copies is a factor of 1.13 smaller than that of the optimal lottery pricing for the multi-
parameter problem. In fact, the mechanism AL with the “same” allocation rule as a lottery pricing L may
obtain zero revenue even when the lottery pricing obtains non-zero revenue. Our main result is that this gap
between Myerson’s mechanism and the optimal lottery pricing is no larger than a factor of 2. Specifically,
given a lottery pricing, we can construct two mechanisms, one being AL and the other a Vickrey auction,
such that the sum of the revenues of the two mechanisms is an upper bound on the revenue of the lottery
pricing. Combining this with the result of Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg (and an improvement over it in
[9]), we get that for a single unit-demand agent multi-parameter problem, the gap between lottery pricings
and item pricings is at most 4.
Chawla et al.’s result as well as our factor-of-4 gap holds for instances where the values of the agent
for different items are independent. For a unit-demand agent, this independence assumption is unrealistic.
However, on the other end of the spectrum, Briest et al. show that with arbitrary correlations between item
values, the gap can be unbounded. We therefore examine the following natural model for values involving
limited correlation. The type of the unit-demand agent is m+1 dimensional — (t0, t1, · · · , tm); the agent’s
value for item i is vi = t0 + ti. Here t0 can be thought of as the buyer’s “base” value for obtaining any
of the items, and the ti’s represent the buyer’s perceived quality of the different items. This additive value
distribution introduces a positive correlation between values of different items1. Figure 2 shows an example
of one such discrete distribution contrasted against a product distribution.
In this additive distribution setting we show that the gap between randomized and deterministic mech-
anisms is at most a factor of 8. Once again our approach is to start with an optimal lottery pricing for the
multi-parameter instance, construct an ensemble of mechanisms based on it for the related single-parameter
instance, and then construct a pricing for the multi-parameter instance based on the mechanisms.
Our results extend to multi-agent settings as well. The simplest multi-agent setting we consider involves
n agents and m items (with copies), where the seller faces a supply constraint for each of the items. A
feasible allocation is a matching between agents and items that respects multiplicities of items. More gen-
erally, we consider settings where the seller faces a matroid feasibility constraint—any feasible allocation
must be an independent set in a given matroid in addition to allocating at most one item per agent (see
Section 5.1 for the definition of a matroid). In both these cases we show that the gap between the expected
revenue of the optimal randomized and the optimal deterministic mechanisms is a small constant factor.
Once again we rely on the approach of relating the multi-parameter instance to a single-parameter instance
where each unit-demand agent is split into multiple selfish “pseudo-agents”. This approach was first devel-
oped in [9]. In particular we showed in [9] that for the settings described above, there exist deterministic
mechanisms that obtain revenue within a constant factor of the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for the
related single-parameter instance. In Section 5 we show that the revenue of any randomized mechanism for
1This model is similar to “multiplicative” value distributions that have been studied previously in the context of bundle pricing
problems (see, e.g., [2]).
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these settings can be bounded from above by 5 times the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for the single-
parameter instance. The challenge in these settings is to ensure that the mechanisms that we construct satisfy
the non-trivial feasibility constraint that the seller faces.
Related work
As mentioned earlier, randomness is used extensively in prior-free mechanism design (see, e.g., [11] and
references therein). While symmetric deterministic mechanisms provably cannot obtain any guarantees on
revenue in that setting, Aggarwal et al. [1] show that by exploiting asymmetry prior-free mechanisms can
be derandomized at a constant factor loss in revenue.
Our mechanism design setting with unit-demand agents is closely related to the standard setting for envy-
free pricing problems considered in literature [10, 5, 4, 6, 8]; Those works study the single-agent problem
with a correlated value distribution and aim to approximate the optimal deterministic mechanism (item
pricing). Our single-agent setting is most closely related to the work of Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg [8]
who gave a 3 approximation to the optimal deterministic mechanism for single-agent product-distribution
instances, and builds upon techniques developed in that work.
In economics literature, the study of Bayesian optimal mechanisms has focused on deterministic mecha-
nisms. It is well-known that for single-parameter instances the optimal mechanism is deterministic [14, 16].
Following Myerson’s result [14] for single-parameter mechanisms, there were a number of attempts to ob-
tain simple characterizations of optimal mechanisms in the multi-parameter setting [13, 17, 19], however
no general-purpose characterization of such mechanisms is known [19]. Recently Chawla et al. [9] gave
the first approximations to optimal deterministic mechanisms for a large class of multi-parameter problems.
This paper extends techniques developed in that work and one of the implications of our work is that the
mechanisms developed in [9] are approximately-optimal with respect to the optimal randomized mecha-
nisms as well.
The study of the benefit of randomness in multi-parameter mechanism design was initiated by Thanas-
soulis [18] who presented single-parameter instances with valuations drawn from product distributions
where randomness helps increase the revenue by about 8-10%. Manelli and Vincent [12] and Pavlov [15]
presented other examples with small gaps. Briest et al. [7] were the first to uncover the extent of the benefit
of randomization. They showed that lottery pricings can be arbitrarily better than item pricings in terms of
revenue even for the case of 4 items offered to a single agent.
2 Definitions and problem set-up
2.1 Bayesian optimal mechanism design
We study the following mechanism design problem. There is one seller and n buyers (agents) indexed by
the set I . The seller offers m different services indexed by the set J . Agents are risk-neutral and are each
interested in buying any one of the m services. Agent i has value vij for service j which is a random
variable. We use v−i to denote the vector of values of all agents except agent i. The seller faces no costs for
providing service, but must satisfy certain feasibility constraints (e.g. supply constraints in a limited supply
setting). We represent these feasibility constraints as a set system J over pairs (i, j), that is, J ⊆ 2I×J .
Each subset of I × J in J is a feasible allocation of services to agents.
The seller’s goal is to maximize her revenue in expectation over the buyers’ valuations. We call this
problem the Bayesian multi-parameter unit-demand (optimal) mechanism design problem (BMUMD). A
deterministic mechanism for this problem maps any set of bids b to an allocation M(b) ∈ J and a pricing
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π(b) with a price πi to be paid by agent i. A randomized mechanism maps a set of bids to a distribution
over J ; we use M(b) to denote this distribution over I × J .
We focus on the class of incentive compatible mechanisms and will hereafter assume that b = v. We
use RM (v) to denote the revenue of a mechanism M at valuation vector v: RM (v) =
∑
i∈I πi(v) where
π is the pricing rule for M . To aid disambiguation, we sometimes use RMi (v) to denote πi(v) for M . The
expected revenue of a mechanism is RM = Ev[RM (v)].
We consider the following special cases of the BMUMD:
Setting 1: Single agent with independent values. The agent values item j at vj , which is an independent
random variable with distribution Fj and density fj .
Setting 2: Single agent with additive values. There are m items, and the agent’s type, {t0, · · · , tm}, is
m + 1 dimensional. tj is distributed independently according to Fj . The agent’s value for item
j is vj = t0 + tj .
Setting 3: Multiple agents and multiple items with independent values. There are n agents and m items.
Agent i’s value for item j, vij , is distributed independently according to Fij . Any matching
between items and agents is feasible.
Setting 4: Multiple unit-demand agents with matroid feasibility constraint. There are n agents and m
services. Agent i’s value for item j, vij , is distributed independently according to Fij . The set
system J is an intersection of a matroid with the unit-demand constraints for the agents and is
thus a generalization of the previous matching setting. (See Section 5.1 for the definition of a
matroid.)
Single-parameter mechanism design
The single-parameter version of the Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem (abbreviated BSMD) is
stated as follows. There are n single-parameter agents and a single seller providing a certain service. Agent
i’s value vi for getting served is a random variable. We use v−i to denote the vector of values of all agents
except agent i. The seller faces a feasibility constraint specified by a set system J ⊆ 2[n], and is allowed to
serve any set of agents in J . As in the multi parameter case, a mechanism M for this problem is a function
that maps a vector of values v to an allocation M(v) ∈ J and a pricing π(v). Myerson’s seminal work
describes the revenue maximizing mechanism for BSMD; this optimal mechanism is deterministic.
2.2 Relating multi-parameter MD to single-parameter MD
In previous work [9] we presented a general reduction from the multi-parameter optimal mechanism design
problem to the single-parameter setting. This approach begins with defining an instance Icopies of the BSMD
given an instance I of the BMUMD. Our previous work then shows that for several kinds of feasibility
constraints there exists a deterministic mechanism for I with revenue at least a constant fraction of that of
the optimal mechanism for Icopies. We state these results below without proof.
We begin by describing the instance Icopies. Let I be an instance of the BMUMD with n agents and a
single seller providing m different services, and with feasibility constraint J . We define a new instance of
the BSMD in the following manner. We split each agent in I into m distinct agents (hereafter called “copies”
or “pseudo-agents”). Each pseudo-agent is interested in a single item j ∈ [m] and behaves independently
of (and potentially to the detriment of) other pseudo-agents. Formally, the instance has mn distinct pseudo-
agents each interested in a single service; pseudo-agent (i, j)’s value for getting served, vij , is distributed
according to Fij . The mechanism again faces a feasibility constraint given by the set system J .
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Icopies is similar to I except that it involves more competition (among different pseudo-agents corre-
sponding to the same multi-parameter agent). Therefore it is natural to expect that a seller can obtain more
revenue in the instance Icopies than in I . The following results show that in Settings 1 and 3 it cannot obtain
too much more.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 4 and 10 in [9]) Given an instance I of the single agent BMUMD (Setting 1), there
exists a truthful deterministic mechanism for I , whose revenue is at least 1/2 of the revenue of any truthful
mechanism for the instance Icopies.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 14 in [9]) Given an instance I of the BMUMD with multiple agents and multiple
items (Setting 3), there exists a truthful deterministic mechanism for I , whose revenue is at least 4/27th of
the revenue of any truthful mechanism for the instance Icopies.
In Setting 4, [9] obtain a somewhat weaker result comparing the revenue of an incentive-compatible
mechanism for Icopies to that of a deterministic mechanism for I that is not truthful but is an implementation
in undominated strategies [3]. Formally, for an agent i, a strategy si is said to be dominated by a strategy
s′i if for all strategies s−i of other agents, the utility that i obtains from using si is no better than that from
using s′i, and for some strategy s−i, it is strictly worse. A mechanism is an algorithmic implementation of
an α-approximation in undominated strategies if for every outcome of the mechanism where every agent
plays an undominated strategy, the objective function value of the mechanism is within a factor of α of the
optimal, and every agent can easily compute for any dominated strategy a strategy that dominates it.
Theorem 3 (Theorem 17 in [9]) Given an instance I of the BMUMD with unit-demand agents and a general
matroid constraint (Setting 4), there exists a deterministic mechanism for I implemented in undominated
strategies, whose revenue is at least 1/8th of the revenue of any truthful mechanism for the instance Icopies.
3 Lotteries and randomized mechanisms
We now define a class of mechanisms for the BMUMD that will be useful in our analysis. The following
subsection shows that this class encompasses arbitrary randomized mechanisms.
3.1 Lotteries or random allocations
An m-dimensional lottery is a vector ℓ = (q1, · · · , qm, p) where p is the price of the lottery and (q1, · · · , qm)
is a probability distribution over m items,
∑
j∈[m] qj ≤ 1. A lottery pricing L = {ℓ1, ℓ2, · · · } is a random-
ized selling mechanism for m items targeted towards a single unit-demand buyer where the buyer is offered
a collection of (an arbitrary number of) lotteries. The buyer can select any one or no lottery from the col-
lection, and is then allocated an item drawn from the probability distribution defined by the lottery and
charged the price of the lottery. A rational risk-neutral buyer selects the lottery that maximizes her utility:∑
j∈[m] qjvj − p.
A lottery-based mechanism ML for m services targeted towards n agents is a randomized selling mech-
anism defined through an ensemble of lottery pricings L. ML and L satisfy the following properties:
1. For every instantiation of values of the agents v, L contains n lottery pricings, L1(v), · · · ,Ln(v),
where Li(v) is an m-dimensional lottery pricing targeted toward agent i.
2. Li(v) is a function of v−i, the values of all agents other than agent i.
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3. The mechanism ML is implemented as follows. It first elicits bids b from agents, and then offers
to agent i (simultaneously with other agents) the lottery pricing Li(b). Let ℓi(b) denote the lottery
picked by agent i and let qij(b) denote the probability with which lottery ℓi(b) offers service j to
agent i. Agent i is allocated item j with probability qij(b).2
4. The probabilities qij(v) satisfy the following feasibility constraint:∑
(i,j)∈S
qij(v) ≤ r(S), ∀S ⊆ I × J, ∀v
where r(S) is the cardinality of some maximum sized feasible subset of S.3
3.2 Randomized mechanisms as lotteries
We now show that every truthful randomized mechanism for the BMUMD can be interpreted as a truthful
lottery-based mechanism.
Lemma 4 Every incentive-compatible randomized mechanism for a multi-agent BMUMD problem is equiv-
alent to a lottery-based mechanism.
Proof: Given a mechanism M with randomized allocation rule M(v) and pricing rule π(v) we define a
lottery-based mechanism as follows. Consider an agent i and a fixed instantiation of v−i. Then for every
instantiation of vi, consider the probabilities with which M allocates service j to agent i, as well as the prices
that M charges. Each such probability vector along with the corresponding price forms a lottery in Li(v−i)
in the new mechanism. Formally, Li(v−i) = {(qi, pi) | ∃vi with qi = Mi(v−i,vi) and pi = πi(v−i,vi)}.
We now claim that the allocation rule and pricing rule of the new mechanism is precisely the same as the
old mechanism. Suppose not. Then at some valuation vector v and for some agent i, (qi(v−i,vi), pi(v−i,vi)) 6=
(Mi(v−i,vi), πi(v−i,vi)), where the former is the allocation and price rule for the lottery-based mecha-
nism and the latter the allocation and price rule for the original mechanism M . But, given our construction,
(qi(v−i,vi), pi(v−i,vi)) = (M(v−i,v
′
i), πi(v−i,v
′
i)) for some other value vector v′i for agent i. But this
implies that in M agent i can benefit from lying and reporting v′i when the true value vector is v. This
contradicts the incentive compatibility of M .
3.3 A mechanism for Icopies based on lotteries
As noted earlier, our main technique is to relate the revenue of lottery-based mechanisms for an instance I
of the BMUMD to the optimal mechanism for a related instance Icopies of the BSMD. We now describe a
mechanism for Icopies based on a given lottery-based mechanism for I .
Consider an instance I of the BMUMD. Given a lottery-based mechanism ML for I that uses the
ensemble of lottery pricings L, we define a mechanism AL for the instance Icopies.
Based on L, the mechanism AL forms a one dimensional lottery pricing for each of the mn pseudo-
agents. The lottery pricing offered to pseudo-agent (i, j), which we denote Lij , is a function of v−ij
2Note that these allocations to agents are not necessarily done independently; The feasibility constraint may require correlations
between items allocated to different agents. However these details do not affect our analysis, so we ignore them.
3This condition is weaker than may be necessary for certain kinds of set systems, but suffices for our purpose.
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and is derived from the lottery pricing Li ∈ L as follows. Given a valuation vector v−ij , for each ℓ =
(qi1, qi2, . . . , qim, p) ∈ Li(v−i), A
L adds a lottery ℓj = (q′, p′) to Lij defined by
q′ = qij; and
p′ = p−
∑
k 6=j
qikvik + uij(v−ij),
where the term uij(v−ij) ≥ 0 is chosen to be the least value ensuring that the lottery preferred by pseudo-
agent (i, j) when vij = 0 (if any) has a non-negative price.
We note the following properties of AL:
1. (truthfulness) That AL is truthful follows immediately from the fact that the one dimensional lottery
pricing Lij offered to pseudo-agent (i, j) does not depend on vij , and the pseudo-agent may choose
any lottery from Lij .
2. (allocation rule) Suppose first that for (i, j) and some v−ij , uij(v−ij) = 0. Then for any vij , the
utility of pseudo-agent (i, j) from lottery ℓj ∈ Lij is the same as utility of agent i from lottery ℓ ∈ Li.
Therefore with uij(v−ij) = 0, in ML agent i purchases lottery ℓ ∈ Li if and only if, in AL the
pseudo-agent (i, j) purchases lottery ℓj ∈ Lij . Moreover, since the price shifts uij(v−ij) we apply
are the same for every lottery offered to (i, j), the only manner in which preferences can change is if
the pseudo-agent obtains negative utility from his preferred lottery, in which case he chooses to buy
no lottery at all. However, our choice of uij(v−ij) ensures that the agent obtains non-negative utility
at vij = 0 and thus also at arbitrary vij , and so the allocation rule of AL is identical to that of ML.
3. (feasibility) Feasibility follows immediately from the fact that ML satisfies feasibility and the alloca-
tion rules of the two mechanisms are identical.
4. (nonnegative revenue) Our choice of uij(v−ij) ensures that the revenue AL receives from each agent
is always nonnegative; this is critical in later arguments, since it allows us to claim that the revenue
that AL obtains from any subset of the pseudo-agents is bounded from above by the total expected
revenue of AL.
We now relate the revenues of ML and AL. Let a be any function carrying valuation vectors to sets
of pseudo-agents which respects the unit-demand constraint, i.e. for any valuation vector v, for each i ∈ I
there exists at most one j ∈ J such that (i, j) ∈ a(v). We call such a function a unit-demand allocation
function. Then we get the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For any valuation vector v and any unit-demand allocation function a(v), we have
RM
L
(v) ≤
∑
(i,j)∈a(v)
RA
L
ij (v) +
∑
(i,j)/∈a(v)
qij(v)vij
≤ RA
L
(v) +
∑
(i,j)/∈a(v)
qij(v)vij ,
where ℓi(v) = (qi1(v), . . . , qim(v), pi(v)) is the lottery purchased by agent i at valuation v in the mecha-
nism ML.
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Proof: The revenue RML(v) of the lottery-based mechanism ML at v can be written as the sum of the
revenues from the constituent lottery pricings:
RM
L
(v) =
n∑
i=1
RM
L
i (v).
If we define ℓi(v) = (qi1(v), . . . , qim(v), pi(v)) ∈ Li to be the lottery chosen by agent i at v, then
RM
L
i (v), which is just the price pi(v), can be written as
RM
L
i (v) =

pi(v)−∑
k 6=j
qik(v)vik

+∑
k 6=j
qik(v)vik
≤ RA
L
ij (v) +
∑
k 6=j
qik(v)vik,
(1)
for any j, where RALij (v) is the revenue of mechanism AL from the pseudo-agent (i, j). Furthermore, since
agent i would never elect to purchase a lottery yielding negative utility, we also have that
RM
L
i (v) ≤
∑
k
qik(v)vik. (2)
Note that we designed AL such it receives nonnegative revenue from every pseudo-agent, and a contains
at most one pseudo-agent (i, j) for any i; so by applying one of (1) or (2) for each i according to which
pseudo-agents a(v) contains, we get that
RM
L
(v) ≤
∑
(i,j)∈a(v)
RA
L
ij (v) +
∑
(i,j)/∈a(v)
qij(v)vij
≤ RA
L
(v) +
∑
(i,j)/∈a(v)
qij(v)vij ,
the claimed bound.
4 Single-agent setting
In this section we focus on instances of the BMUMD involving a single agent and m items. In the single
agent setting, randomized and deterministic mechanisms become simply lotteries and pricings, respectively.
Briest et al. [7] demonstrated that when values for different items are arbitrarily correlated, it is possible
to construct examples where the ratio between the optimal expected revenues from lotteries and pricings is
unbounded. We show that in the absence of such correlation this ratio is small. Specifically, when values
are distributed independently, the ratio is no more than 4 (Section 4.1). Moreover, when values have a
certain kind of positive correlation (additive values; Setting 2 described in Section 2.1), the ratio is at most
8 (Section 4.2).
4.1 Independent values (Setting 1)
We first analyze Setting 1, that is where the value of the agent for item i, vi, is independently distributed
according to c.d.f. Fi. Given an instance I of the single agent BMUMD, consider the form of the associated
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instance Icopies. Note that while each pseudo-agent desires a different item, the fact that only one item may
be sold means they are effectively competing for the same thing, the privilege of being served. Thus, Icopies
can be thought of as being in a single-item auction setting. This observation leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 6 For any instance I of the BMUMD in Setting 1, the revenue of the optimal deterministic mecha-
nism is at least one-fourth the revenue of the optimal randomized mechanism.
Proof: As previously observed, any randomized mechanism in the single-agent setting is precisely a lottery
pricing L. Let the mechanism AL be as described in Section 3.3. Applying Lemma 5 with a(v) = i∗ =
argmaxi(vi) yields
RL(v) ≤ RA
L
(v) +
∑
i 6=i∗
qi(v)vi
≤ RA
L
(v) + max
i 6=i∗
vi,
since the qi(v)’s sum to at most one. The key observation is that the second term is precisely the revenue
that the Vickrey auction V would achieve in the instance Icopies given bids v; so we get that in expectation
RL ≤ RA
L
+RV ,
and need only apply Theorem 1 to prove the lemma.
4.2 Additive values (Setting 2)
We demonstrate that a result similar to that of the previous section holds even in the presence of certain
types of correlation. Consider again the single agent setting; since the agent is unit demand, it makes sense
to think of the services being offered as perfect substitutes. A natural form of correlation, then, would be
for the agent to have some “base” value for being served (regardless of which service is received), plus an
additive value specific to the particular service received.
The setting we consider modifies the single-agent setting by making agent types consist of (m + 1)
independently distributed values {t0, t1, . . . , tm}; now, the agent’s value for item i becomes vi = ti + t0.
Let L be a lottery system over m items in the additive setting described. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Given an instance I of the BMUMD in Setting 2, the revenue of any lottery system L for I
satisfies RL ≤ 8Rp, for some pricing p for I .
Proof: We begin by demonstrating a bound with a weaker multiplicative factor of 9 and then show how to
improve it to a factor of 8. Our main technique is to consider an uncorrelated setting I ′ derived from I . We
define I ′ to be a single agent setting with (m+1) items, and interpret the values {t0, . . . , tm}making up an
agent’s type in I as being the values of the agent in setting I ′ for the (m+ 1) items. In keeping with I , the
feasibility constraint we associate with I ′ is that we may sell item 0, and at most one additional item from
among items 1, . . . ,m. Note that the agent in I ′ is not a unit-demand agent.
We now construct a lottery system L′ for instance I ′ from L. Let ℓ = (q1, . . . , qm, p) be a lottery in
L. Define q0 =
∑m
i=1 qi, and construct ℓ′ = (q0, . . . , qm, p). Note that ℓ′ does not necessarily satisfy the
requirement that the qi’s sum to at most one; it does, however, satisfy the feasible constraint indicated for
I ′. We may thus still apply the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 6, albeit with a worsened constant.
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Let L′ be the system over m + 1 services consisting of all of the ℓ′ defined as above based on ℓ ∈ L.
Now, for any setting of t0, . . . , tm, note that the the utility an agent in I receives from a particular lottery
ℓ ∈ L is
m∑
i=1
qivi − p =
m∑
i=1
qi(ti + t0)− p =
m∑
i=0
qiti − p,
precisely the utility a corresponding agent in I ′ would receive from the corresponding ℓ′ ∈ L′. We thus
have RL = RL′ .
Consider applying the proof of Lemma 6 toL′. Due to the less restrictive feasibility constraint (∑mi=0 qi ≤
2) we get
RM
L′
≤ RA
L′
+ 2RV
′
≤ 3RM
′
,
where the mechanisms AL′ and V ′ are interpreted as being in the copies setting Icopies′ associated with I ′,
and M′ is the optimal mechanism in this setting. In order to prove a bound of the form desired, however,
we need to relate a mechanism in the setting Icopies′ to a deterministic one (a pricing) in I .
The key observation is that our feasibility constraint in Icopies′ (carried over from I ′) means thatM′ may
make decisions about allocations and prices for pseudo-agent 0 separately from those for pseudo-agents
1, . . . ,m; as such, M effectively consists of two mechanisms, one serving pseudo-agent 0 and another
serving pseudo-agents 1, . . . ,m, both under a unit-demand constraint. Now, the optimal mechanism for
serving the lone single-parameter pseudo-agent is a pricing, and Theorem 1 gives us that a mechanism
serving pseudo-agents 1, . . . ,m is within a factor of 2 of a pricing on m items; so recalling that an agent in
setting I has a value of vi = ti + t0 for item i, we can see that
RL ≤ 3RM ≤ 9Rp,
where p is the optimal pricing for the setting I .
In order to improve the factor from 9 to 8, we need to consider the revenue a mechanism M in the
setting Icopies′ obtains from pseudo-agent 0 and from pseudo-agents 1, . . . ,m; at a particular valuation
vector t denote these quantities as RM0 (t) and RM−0(t), respectively. Now, as previously noted, the optimal
mechanism M in Icopies′ may treat pseudo-agent 0 independently from pseudo-agents 1, . . . ,m; thus, we
have that any mechanism M in this setting must satisfy both RM0 (t) ≤ R
M
0 (t) and RM−0(t) ≤ R
M
−0(t).
Since we know that
∑m
i=1 qi ≤ 1, when t0 is the maximum among all the ti, Lemma 5 implies
RL(t) ≤ RA
L
0 (t) +R
V
0 (t);
On the other hand, when one of t1, . . . , tm takes on the maximum value, we end up with, for some i,
RL(t) ≤ RA
L
i (t) + 2R
V
i (t),
Combining these two gives us a pointwise guarantee of
RL(t) ≤ RA
L
0 (t) +R
V
0 (t) +R
AL
−0 (t) + 2R
V
−0(t)
≤ 2RM0 (t) + 3R
M
−0(t).
Therefore,
RL ≤ 2RM0 + 3R
M
−0 ≤ 2R
p + 6Rp
implying the claimed bound of 8.
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5 Multi-agent setting
In this section we study multi-agent versions of the BMUMD and once again bound the gap between deter-
ministic and randomized mechanisms with respect to expected revenue for this setting. The starting point
for our bounds is the observation in Section 3.2 that randomized mechanisms for this problem can be inter-
preted as lottery-based mechanisms. We first discuss Setting 3, namely instances with multiple agents and
multiple items and a “matching” feasibility constraint. The following subsection contains a more general
version with a matroid intersection feasibility constraint (Setting 4).
5.1 The multi-item auction setting (Setting 3)
We consider instances of the BMUMD where the seller has m different items, with kj copies of item j,
and each of the n unit-demand buyers have independently distributed values for each item. The seller’s
constraint is to allocate item j to no more than kj agents, and to allocate at most one item to each agent.
We note that the set system defined by this feasibility constraint is a matroid intersection. A set system
(E,F) where E is the ground set of elements (E = I × J in our setting) is a matroid if it satisfies the
following properties.
1. (heredity) For every A ∈ F , B ⊂ A implies B ∈ F .
2. (augmentation) For every A,B ∈ F with |A| > |B|, there exists an e ∈ A\B such that B∪{e} ∈ F .
The sets in a matroid set system are called independent sets.
A matroid intersection set system F is an intersection of two matroids: F = F1 ∩ F2 where F1 and
F2 are matroids. The unit-demand constraint and the supply constraints for each item are each instances
of a partition matroid. Thus the system J in this setting can be seen to be an intersection of two partition
matroids. We use J1 and J2 to denote the two constituent matroids, and the term matching to refer to any
allocation or set in J .
We will need the following facts about matroids.
Proposition 8 Let B1 and B2 be any two independent sets of equal size in some matroid set system E . Then
there is a bijective function g : B1 \ B2 → B2 \ B1 such that for all e ∈ B1 \ B2, B1 \ {e} ∪ {g(e)} is
independent in E .
Corollary 9 Let B1 and B2 be arbitrary independent sets in some matroid set system E . Then there exists
a set B′2 ⊆ B2 and a one to one function g : B′2 → B1 such that for all e ∈ B′2, B1 \ {g(e)} ∪ {e} is
independent in E , and for all e ∈ B2 \B′2, B1 ∪ {e} is independent in E .
Proof: In order to apply Proposition 8 we need independent sets of equal size. So we begin by repeatedly
applying the augmentation property to whichever of B1 and B2 is smaller in order to end up with two sets
B¯1 ⊃ B1 and B¯2 ⊃ B2 such that |B¯1| = |B¯2|. Now, Proposition 8 guarantees us a bijection g : B¯2 \ B¯1 →
B¯1 \ B¯2 such that ∀e ∈ B¯2 \ B¯1, B¯1 \ {g(e)} ∪ {e} is independent.
Set B2′ = B2 \ B¯1 ⊂ B¯2 \ B¯1; note that since B¯1⊂B1 ∪ B2, we have B¯1 \ B¯2 ⊂ B1. Thus, we
may view g as a one to one function g : B2′ → B1. It retains the first specified property, since for any
e ∈ B2
′
, B1 \ {g(e)} ∪ {e} ⊂ B¯1 \ {g(e)} ∪ {e} is independent. Furthermore, e∈B2 \B2′ ⊂ B¯1 implies
B1 ∪ {e} ⊂ B¯1 is independent, and so the second specified property holds as well.
Our proof consists of three steps:
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1. From Lemma 4, we note that any randomized mechanism for this problem can be seen as a lottery-
based mechanism.
2. We bound the revenue of any lottery-based mechanism for an instance I of the BMUMD by those of a
collection of three truthful deterministic mechanisms for the corresponding single-parameter instance
with copies, Icopies.
3. We use the result in [9] (Theorem 2) to construct a truthful deterministic mechanism for I whose
revenue is within a factor of 4/27 of the optimal revenue for Icopies.
Lemma 10 Consider an instance I of the BMUMD in Setting 3. The revenue from any lottery-based mech-
anism ML for I is at most five times the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for the instance Icopies.
Proof: We define three truthful deterministic mechanisms M1, M2, M3 for Icopies, all facing the same
feasibility constraint J as the set of lottery pricings L, such that
RM
L
(v) ≤ RM1(v) + 2
(
RM2(v) +RM3(v)
) (3)
≤ 5RM(v),
The second inequality follows from the optimality of Myerson’s mechanism for single parameter settings
(Myerson’s mechanism also faces the feasibility constraint J ).
Consider the Icopies setting and fix an instantiation of values v. Let A1(v) denote the set of pseudo-
agents that belong to the maximum-valued matching (we drop the argument wherever it is obvious). Among
the remaining (I × J) \ A1 pseudo-agents, again let A2 denote the set of pseudo-agents that belong to the
maximum-valued matching i.e.
A2(v) = argmax
S⊆[mn],S∩A1(v)=∅
S is a matching
v(S).
We may assume without loss of generality that A1 and A2 are defined uniquely.
Note that A1(v) is a unit-demand allocation function. Therefore, Lemma 5 implies that
RM
L
(v) ≤ RA
L
(v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
+
∑
(i,j)/∈A1(v)
qij(v)vij
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term2
. (4)
We now define the three mechanisms M1, M2 and M3 for Icopies. Mechanism M1 is AL and so RM1 is
exactly Term1. Mechanisms M2 and M3 are defined in such a way that 2(RM2 +RM3) is at least Term2.
This would prove (3).
Now, Corollary 9 implies the existence of two one to one partial functions with the following properties.
g1 : A2 → A1 s.t. ∀e ∈ A2 :
g1(e) is undefined and A1 ∪ {e} ∈ J1, or
g1(e) is defined and A1 \ {g1(e)} ∪ {e} ∈ J1
g2 : A2 → A1 s.t. ∀e ∈ A2 :
g2(e) is undefined and A1 ∪ {e} ∈ J2, or
g2(e) is defined and A1 \ {g2(e)} ∪ {e} ∈ J2
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Note that the maximality of A1 implies that every element of A2 has an image under either g1 or g2 or both.
We define the mechanisms M2 and M3 by specifying their allocation rules. Given a valuation vector v, the
mechanism M2 serves only those pseudo-agents (i, j) that belong to A1 and for which vij ≥ vg−1
1
(i,j)/2 (if
g−11 is defined at that point). Likewise, mechanism M3 serves only those pseudo-agents (i, j) ∈ A1 that have
vij ≥ vg−1
2
(i,j)/2 (if defined). We note that M2 and M3 have monotone allocation rules, and are therefore
truthful. Truthful payments can be defined appropriately. They also satisfy the feasibility constraint J .
We now prove the revenue guarantee for M2 and M3 through the following two claims.
Claim 1 Twice the combined revenue of mechanisms M2 and M3 is no less than the sum of values of all
pseudo-agents in A2, i.e.,
2
(
RM2(v) +RM3(v)
)
≥
∑
(i,j)∈A2
vij .
Proof:Consider any pseudo-agent (i, j) ∈ A2, and the pseudo-agents g1(i, j) and g2(i, j) ∈ A1 if defined.
Note that A′1 = A1 ∪ (i, j) \ {g1(i, j), g2(i, j)} is feasible. Suppose both vg1(i,j) and vg2(i,j) are less
than vij/2; then the matching A′1 is a valid matching and v(A′1) > v(A1) which is a contradiction to the
optimality of A1. Thus one of vg1(i,j) or vg2(i,j) must be at least vij/2 and we get this amount in M2 or M3
respectively.
Claim 2 The sum of values of all pseudo-agents in A2 is no less than Term2:∑
(i,j)∈A2(v)
vij ≥
∑
(i,j)/∈A1(v)
qij(v)vij .
Proof:Consider the n ×m matrix of all probabilities qij(v). This matrix arose from a feasible randomized
mechanism; it therefore represents a probability distribution over matchings and can be represented as a
convex combination of matchings. In this probability matrix, replace with zeros all the entries (i, j) ∈ A1.
The newly obtained matrix can be represented as a convex combination of matchings all of which have a
zero entry for every (i, j) ∈ A1. Then the claim follows by the definition of A2.
Claims 1 and 2 together with Equations (3) and (4) complete the proof.
Theorem 11 The revenue of any randomized mechanism for an instance of the BMUMD in Setting 3 is at
most 33.75 times the revenue of the optimal truthful deterministic mechanism for the instance.
Proof: The proof follows from Lemmas 4 and 10, and Theorem 2.
5.2 The general matroid setting (Setting 4)
We now show that Theorem 11 extends to the general matroid intersection version of the BMUMD as well.
While Lemma 10 extends to this more general setting almost exactly, the counterpart of Theorem 2 for this
setting is somewhat weaker. So we can only bound the gap between the revenue of an optimal random-
ized incentive-compatible mechanism and that of an optimal deterministic implementation in undominated
strategies (see Theorem 3) for this setting.
As defined earlier, in Setting 4, the seller faces a feasibility constraint specified by the set system J ⊆
2I×J , where I is the set of agents and J is the set of services, J is the intersection of a general matroid
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constraint (given by J1) and the unit demand constraint (that we denote using J2); J = J1 ∩J2. Note that
J2 is also a matroid.
We use the same three step approach as for the matching version to bound the revenue of the randomized
mechanism
Lemma 12 Consider an instance I of the BMUMD in Setting 4. The revenue from any lottery-based mech-
anism ML for instance I is at most five times the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for the single
parameter instance with copies Icopies.
Proof: We will prove this Lemma along the lines of our proof for Lemma 10. We define three truthful
deterministic mechanisms M1, M2, M3 for Icopies so that
RM
L
(v) ≤ RM1(v) + 2
(
RM2(v) +RM3(v)
) (5)
≤ 5RM(v).
As before, given an instantiation of values v, let A1(v) denote the set of pseudo-agents that belong to
the maximum valued feasible set. Among the remaining pseudo-agents, let A2(v) denote the set of pseudo-
agents that belong to the maximum valued feasible set i.e.
A2(v) = argmax
S∈J−A1(v)
v(S)
Lemma 5 implies
RM
L
(v) ≤ RA
L
(v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term1
+
∑
(i,j)/∈A1(v)
qij(v)vij
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term2
.
Therefore, once again we define M1 to be AL and define M2 and M3 in such a way that twice their revenue
combined is no less than Term2.
As before we can define partial one to one functions from A2 to A1 satisfying
g1 : A2 → A1 s.t. ∀e ∈ A2 :
g1(e) is undefined and A1 ∪ {e} ∈ J1, or
g1(e) is defined and A1 \ {g1(e)} ∪ {e} ∈ J1
g2 : A2 → A1 s.t. ∀e ∈ A2 :
g2(e) is undefined and A1 ∪ {e} ∈ J2, or
g2(e) is defined and A1 \ {g2(e)} ∪ {e} ∈ J2
The mechanisms M2 and M3 are also defined as before: M2 serves only those pseudo-agents (i, j) in
A1 for which vij ≥ vg−1
1
(i,j)/2 (if defined), and M3 serves only those pseudo-agents (i, j) ∈ A1 that have
vij ≥ vg−1
2
(i,j)/2 (if defined). We note that every element in A2 gets mapped to at least one and at most
two elements under the partial functions defined above. Therefore, we can extract a revenue of at least
1/2
∑
(i,j)∈A2
vij from M2 and M3 together. Claim 2 now implies the result.
Theorem 13 The revenue of any incentive compatible randomized mechanism for an instance I of the
BMUMD in Setting 4 is at most 40 times the revenue of the optimal deterministic mechanism for I imple-
mented in undominated strategies.
Proof: The proof follows from Lemmas 4 and 12, and Theorem 3.
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6 Discussion and open problems
We show that in multi-parameter Bayesian optimal mechanism design the benefit of randomness is only
a small constant factor when agents are unit-demand and their values for different items have little or no
correlation. We believe that this result should extend to instances involving arbitrary positive correlation
between values of a single agent for items that are substitutes (the unit-demand constraint). For example, it
would be interesting to extend our result to the multiplicative values model of Armstrong [2]. Another open
problem is to extend our techniques beyond the unit-demand setting. This may lead to a better understanding
of and approximations to optimal mechanism design in those settings, for which nothing is known as yet.
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Gap between lottery pricings and Myerson’s mechanism
We give an example where the revenue of a lottery pricing for a single agent BMUMD instance I is 1.13
times the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism for the instance Icopies. The instance I is defined as follows.
There is a single agent with i. i. d. valuations for two items, distributed according to the equal-revenue
distribution, bounded at n. Formally, the valuations v1 and v2 for items 1 and 2 have cdfs F1 and F2 such
that
F1(x) = F2(x) =
{
1− 1/x 1 ≤ x < n
1 x = n
.
For the single parameter setting Icopies, an upper bound on the expected revenue of any mechanism can
be obtained by removing the feasibility constraint of allocating to a single agent at a time. Then, the optimal
revenue with the feasibility constraint is no more than twice the optimal revenue that can be obtained by a
single agent alone. The latter, for the equal revenue distribution, is 1 regardless of the price charged to the
agent. Therefore, the optimal revenue for Icopies is bounded above by 2. The same bound also applies to the
revenue of any item pricing for I .
Now let us consider the following lottery pricing L for I .
L = {(0.5, 0.5, 2.5), (1, 0, 2 +
3n
8
), (0, 1, 2 +
3n
8
)}
The first two coordinates in every lottery denote the probabilities with which items 1 and 2 are offered by
that lottery and the third coordinate is the price.
Figure 3 shows the allocation function of this lottery pricing. In particular, Ri for i ∈ [3] is the set of
valuations where lottery i is bought. The probability mass of regions R2 and R3 together can be computed to
be 2(4/3n+O(log n/n2)). The probability mass of region R1 is 0.4 + 0.08 ln 4− o(1) ≈ 0.51. Therefore,
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the revenue of L can be computed to be 5/2 · 0.51 + 3n/8 · 8/3n + o(1) = 2.275 + o(1). This is a factor
of 1.13 higher than the optimal revenue for Icopies, or the revenue of any item pricing for I .
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Figure 3: The allocation function for the lottery pricing L.
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